Fueling the Future: Recommendations for Strengthening U.S. Uranium Security
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The Issue
Uranium is a crucial mineral for energy and national security—it fuels the nuclear energy that underpins today’s economy and is key to propelling future growth to meet the surge in energy demand from artificial intelligence. However, supply chain vulnerabilities and dependencies on foreign adversaries challenge U.S. leadership in the sector and create national and energy security risks. Russia and China are rapidly expanding their offtake of mined uranium from international partners, uranium enrichment capabilities, and nuclear infrastructure. To strengthen uranium and nuclear fuel supply chains, the United States must work with allies, implement conducive trade and tariff policies, and invest in both domestic enrichment capacity and uranium ore production abroad.
Introduction
Uranium is one of the most consequential elements of the modern era. It led to the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the twentieth century and underpins the renaissance of nuclear energy in the twenty-first century. It is the feedstock for nuclear power, which is the largest source of carbon-free energy in the United States, accounting for 19 percent of total U.S. energy production in 2023. The United States currently produces more nuclear energy than any other country and has the most operating nuclear reactors in the world. But the U.S. lead may not be permanent. For several years, U.S. nuclear electricity generation was declining or stagnant as plants retired without a sufficient number of new reactors to replace them. Consequently, China is set to surpass the United States’ nuclear generator capacity by 2030, with 150 new nuclear reactors set to come online between 2020 and 2035.
Uranium supply is perhaps the biggest threat to U.S. nuclear leadership—but this wasn’t always the case. From 1953 until the 1980s, the United States was the world’s leading producer of uranium, owing partially to government subsidies. During this period, the United States produced between 20 and 45 million pounds of uranium concentrate annually, even reaching a point where it did not need to import any uranium. In comparison, in 2023, the United States produced roughly 50,000 pounds of uranium domestically and imported upward of 30 million pounds annually.
Figure 1: Sources of Uranium for U.S. Nuclear Power Plants, 1950–2022
The U.S. government has deprioritized uranium security over the last seven years. The 2018 United States Geological Survey (USGS) Critical Minerals list, which forms the basis for government incentives like the Inflation Reduction Act, identified uranium as critical. When it released the list in 2018, the USGS noted,
Federal interagency feedback to Interior on the initial draft list highlighted one mineral, uranium, with both fuel and non-fuel uses, and for which Energy Information Administration data indicated high production concentration and significant import reliance . . . uranium, while primarily known as a fuel mineral, also has important non-fuel uses, and otherwise meets the criteria for inclusion.
However, uranium was the only mineral removed from the Biden administration’s 2022 USGS Critical Minerals list on grounds that it was a “fuel mineral.”
There is a clear disconnect in policy efforts to secure front-end fuel cycle capacity—including uranium mining—and efforts directed at nuclear power development. Over the past several years, bipartisan support for nuclear power has been increasing. In 2023, the United States joined 21 countries pledging to triple global nuclear capacity by 2050 at the United Nations Climate Summit in Dubai. Under the White House nuclear deployment roadmap, the United States alone plans to add 200 gigawatts (GW) of domestic nuclear power by 2050. Republican support for boosting nuclear energy is even, on average, much stronger than Democrat support, signaling a more bullish outlook for the industry over the next four years; the Make America Great Again 2024 platform from the Republican National Convention promises that “Republicans will unleash Energy Production from all sources, including nuclear, to immediately slash Inflation and power American homes, cars, and factories with reliable, abundant, and affordable Energy.”
This fundamentally requires creating a resilient, secure, and larger-than-ever uranium supply chain. At present, uranium supply is heavily concentrated in the hands of Russia and China—together, these adversaries hold over 50 percent of the world’s uranium enrichment capacity—creating untenable risks to U.S. energy and national security. Despite this, the United States has not added uranium back to the U.S. Geological Survey’s list of critical minerals, although one of President Trump’s first executive orders on “Unleashing American Energy” called immediately for the secretary of the interior to consider its return. Addressing these risks and building secure uranium supply chains must be on the list of priorities for the incoming administration.
Part of the contentiousness surrounding uranium is its dual use in weapons and energy. This has generated nearly a century of tension. In 1939, Albert Einstein wrote a letter to President Franklin Roosevelt in which he noted that recent research both led him “to expect that the element uranium may be turned into a new and important source of energy in the immediate future,” and that it was also “possible to set up a nuclear chain reaction in a large mass of uranium . . . [that could] . . . lead to the construction of bombs.” He added that “A single bomb of this type, carried by boat and exploded in a port, might very well destroy the whole port together with some of the surrounding territory.”
Today, the United States holds the second-largest nuclear weapons arsenal in the world, following Russia, and is scheduled to spend $756 billion on nuclear weapons modernization programs between fiscal years 2023 and 2032. The United States has been building its nuclear force from land, air, and sea to deter adversaries and assure allies. This key tenet of national security depends on access to fissile uranium materials. At the same time, the United States is engaged in disarmament and arms control agreements and talks with Russia and China, whose nuclear arsenals rival that of the United States. This dichotomy presents a unique set of challenges for policymakers and the uranium industry—how do you expand uranium production, enrichment capacity, and access for the United States and its close allies while adequately containing the industry to avoid the proliferation of nuclear weapons by adversaries?
Nonetheless, to remain ahead of foreign adversaries in nuclear energy production and defense capabilities, the United States must work internally and with allies to develop a secure uranium supply chain that does not depend on imports or infrastructure from adversaries. Given that it is a reliable source of baseload power, nuclear power will be vital for meeting the growing demand for energy that is being driven by artificial intelligence.
The Uranium Supply Chain
The uranium-to-nuclear fuel supply chain is lengthy, complex, and riddled with supply chain vulnerabilities each step of the way, from mine to reactor. Uranium is mined primarily in Kazakhstan (43 percent), Canada (15 percent), Namibia (11 percent), Australia (9 percent), Uzbekistan (7 percent), and Russia (5 percent). The United States mined a mere 75 metric tons of uranium in 2022— a negligible amount equivalent to just 0.02 percent of the world’s production. The ore is then milled into triuranium oxide (U3O8), commonly known as yellow cake. Global yellow cake production is similarly dominated by Kazakhstan (39 percent), Canada (20 percent), Namibia (12 percent), Australia (9 percent), Uzbekistan (7 percent), and Russia (5 percent). Yellow cake uranium undergoes the enrichment process to increase the concentration of the uranium-235 isotope (U-235), the only fissile uranium isotope found in nature, from just 0.7 percent of total uranium to upward of 5 percent.
The uranium enrichment process is where foreign adversaries tighten their control on nuclear supply chains. Four companies dominate this stage in the fuel cycle: Russia’s State Nuclear Energy Corporation (Rosatom), the China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC), Orano in France, and British-German-Dutch consortium Urenco Group. At present, Rosatom holds 38.5 percent of the world’s uranium enrichment capacity, and China’s CNNC holds 24.2 percent. Together, they control 62.7 percent of the world’s commercial uranium enrichment capacity. The United States has only one commercially operating enrichment plant, with limited capacity, which is owned by Urenco. The vast majority of the United States’ uranium must be imported, with nearly 30 percent coming from Russia in 2022.
The U.S. reliance on Russian uranium can be traced back to the Megatons to Megawatts Program—a government-industry partnership initiated between the United States and Russia after the fall of the Soviet Union. For 20 years, the program took bomb-grade uranium from decommissioned Russian nuclear weapons and converted it into low-enriched uranium suitable for U.S. commercial nuclear reactors. At the time, the program successfully enhanced world security by decreasing stockpiles of nuclear weapon materials while generating clean power. Although the program came to an end in 2013, the U.S. nuclear industry still relies on Russia for much of its enriched uranium.
Complicating matters further, the next generation of advanced reactors will require fuel enriched to higher U-235 concentrations (between 5 and 19.5 percent), known as high-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU). The U.S. Department of Energy projects that more than 50 metric tons of HALEU will be needed per year by the end of the decade for the 20 different U.S. companies currently developing advanced reactors. The United States has yet to reach commercial-level production of HALEU. Russia and China are the only countries confirmed to have the infrastructure to produce HALEU at scale.
China’s Strategic Offtake of Uranium from Developing Markets
Russia is not the only foreign adversary of concern in the uranium supply chain. China is swiftly taking strategic action to secure uranium for its ambitious nuclear agenda. It has made strategic investments in uranium-rich countries around the world to secure feedstock for its domestic nuclear programs—both civil and defense.
Namibia has the world’s third-largest uranium reserves, with 11 percent of the world’s supply, and is responsible for 12 percent of global yellow cake production. The China National Uranium Corporation (CNUC), China General Nuclear Power Group, and China Africa Development Fund hold significant ownership stakes in all three of Namibia’s operating uranium mines. An additional risk is posed by the government of Iran, which holds a minority stake (15 percent) in the Rössing operation through a 1976 transaction. However, CNUC and the government of Namibia adhere to all international sanctions on Iran. As a result of this China-Namibia partnership in the uranium mining sector, 77 percent of Namibia’s uranium exports goes to China. There is currently no notable U.S. investment in Namibia’s uranium sector, despite the two countries sharing positive economic relations and Namibia being a key beneficiary of the African Growth and Opportunity Act.
China has also engaged in bilateral cooperation with Kazakhstan to extract uranium and produce nuclear fuel. Kazakhstan is the largest uranium producer in the world, accounting for 43 percent of world production. The central Asian country also holds some of the highest value deposits in the world for low-cost extraction. China has been purchasing natural uranium from Kazakhstan since the early 2000s, and it has signed purchase contracts across an array of suppliers. With a longstanding working relationship with Kazatomprom, Kazakhstan’s national nuclear company, China offtakes nearly 30 percent of Kazakhstan’s uranium exports.
Finally, China is making strategic investments in nations that have yet to develop their significant uranium resources. For example, Brazil holds 5 percent of the world’s uranium reserves yet produces only a negligible amount of uranium. Nuclear Industries of Brazil is eager for industry collaborators, calling for bids from foreign partners interested in uranium exploration in the country. China answered the call. In November 2024, China Nonferrous Trade (CNT) purchased Brazil’s largest uranium mine for just $340 million.
A Comparison of Uranium Policies Under Trump and Biden
The nuclear energy industry largely enjoyed support from both the Trump and Biden administrations as an imperative for energy security. During his first administration, President Trump signed two bills to facilitate building and receiving permits for advanced nuclear reactors, increased funding for the industry in annual budgets, and established the U.S. Nuclear Fuel Working Group. President Biden also passed funding for nuclear projects in both the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA) and the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA). The two administrations, however, targeted different ends of the nuclear supply chain: The Trump administration was generally more focused on the upstream mining of uranium, while the Biden administration focused more resources on the front and back ends of the nuclear fuel and reactor industry.
Under President Trump’s first administration, he set up the Nuclear Fuel Working Group to address the “significant challenges in producing uranium domestically” as “an issue of national security.” As a result of the group’s findings, President Trump requested $1.5 billion from Congress in his 2021 budget request to revitalize the uranium industry and create a national uranium stockpile, saying that propping up U.S. uranium production in the face of cheaper imports was a matter of vital energy security. The $1.5 billion would have provided significant subsidization to domestic upstream uranium mining companies. The move was not without opposition; critics argued that the measure was a thinly veiled government bailout of the uranium industry, consisting of primarily just two companies and their investors. The budget request was ultimately interrupted just weeks later by the Covid-19 crisis and Trump’s unsuccessful bid for reelection.
President Biden addressed the nuclear energy industry within both the IIJA and the IRA. However, uranium is not classified as a USGS critical mineral, meaning it will not qualify for the suite of IRA incentives aimed at the critical mineral industry. Rather, the nuclear industry was addressed in separate provisions in the IRA and IIJA. Together, these provisions mobilized billions of dollars in funding through the Department of Energy (DOE) for the development of domestic HALEU for advanced nuclear reactors, nuclear technology demonstrations, loan guarantees for large projects, and tax credits to reduce the costs of technology commercialization. Notably, the IRA and IIJA focused on the downstream nuclear sector rather than upstream uranium mining. While lithium, nickel, and cobalt mining projects are eligible for some incentives under the IRA and IIJA, no incentives currently exist for raw uranium production.
President Biden also signed into law the Accelerating Deployment of Versatile, Advanced Nuclear for Clean Energy (ADVANCE) Act in July 2024. The bipartisan bill aims to promote a domestic nuclear energy renaissance by streamlining and reducing costs for licensing and permitting for reactors as well as expanding opportunities for foreign direct investment. The bill focuses entirely on the downstream nuclear energy industry and does not address uranium supply chains.
Only in its final months did the Biden administration turn its attention to uranium supply chain concerns. In August 2024, the Prohibiting Russian Uranium Imports Act went into effect, banning the import of enriched uranium from Russia. The bill is complemented by $2.7 billion in appropriated funds for domestic uranium enrichment, as directed by the Nuclear Fuel Security Act. The DOE is directed to expand the American Assured Fuel Supply Program to ensure the availability of uranium, including HALEU, from domestic sources and allies. It is so far unclear how the DOE plans on achieving the program objectives.
The United States will need to figure out its strategy for securing enriched uranium quickly to meet its supply needs. Global demand for enriched uranium is expected to rise 28 percent as new reactors come online, and the United States could need an estimated 2000 metric tons of HALEU by 2035—an industry that currently does not exist at commercial scale outside of Russia. The United States is the world’s largest importer of enriched uranium. While nearly 70 percent of its imports come from European countries (France, Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom), the remaining 30 percent currently comes from Russia.
What Does the Return of the Trump Administration Mean for the Nuclear and Uranium Industries?
As Trump returns to the oval office, the landscape of mining and minerals policy is vastly different than four years ago during his first term. Critical mineral security is at the forefront of geopolitical policy concerns. The Covid-19 pandemic demonstrated just how vulnerable to disruption supply chains are, and policymakers on both sides of the aisle have sworn to remove all reliance on foreign adversaries from these supply chains, both upstream and downstream. At the same time, tensions with both China and Russia are at all-time highs since the Cold War. The political environment is ripe to address the uranium supply chain with policy actions.
Trump will need large quantities of uranium to feed his nuclear energy and defense agendas. Reducing electricity costs is a key priority for Trump, who has made promises to slash energy costs in half within 18 months of taking office. With an all-of-the-above energy strategy, Trump stated on day one that he will “approve new drilling, new pipelines, new refineries, new power plants, new reactors.” Reliable supplies of uranium will be necessary to support these new reactors coming online. Additionally, Trump’s nuclear weapons policy, if anything like his first term, is likely to favor building nuclear capabilities for deterrence over arms reduction efforts and diplomatic agreements with foreign adversaries. Greater quantities of highly enriched uranium will be required for a buildup of nuclear weapons stockpiles.
The domestic uranium mining industry will likely find more support under the Trump administration, and projects may encounter fewer permitting delays and hurdles. Uranium mines in Arizona and Utah have sat dormant for years due to fierce criticism from native tribes and environmentalists. Following the requests of native tribes, President Biden designated a million acres of land in Arizona a national monument, permanently banning mining from the uranium-rich region. President Trump has historically downsized national monuments, and may reverse some, or all, of President Biden’s designation in Arizona as well as open the region back up to mining projects. Additionally, Trump may reintroduce his uranium subsidies from 2019 with the goal of building a domestic uranium industry that can feed strategic stockpiles.
Additionally, the Trump administration may deprioritize government support for, and perhaps even defund, the DOE’s Loan Program Office (LPO), which has been vital for financing downstream nuclear industry, particularly for large, expensive nuclear reactor projects. The LPO has served as a lifeline for large nuclear power expansions such as Georgia Power’s Plant Vogtle. Vogtle is now the nation’s largest energy generation site of any kind in the United States, and the first nuclear reactor built in the United States in 35 years. The project was made possible by $12 billion in loan guarantees from the LPO. Still, the project faced major obstacles that resulted in seven years of delays and $17 billion in cost overruns. Consequently, this means higher energy costs for Georgia Power customers. Trump has been highly critical of both the Vogtle project and the LPO. Yet, defunding the LPO would mean that large nuclear projects like Vogtle’s would have substantially less access to large loan guarantees.
Policy Recommendations for the Incoming Administration and Congress
- Accelerate and expand incentives for domestic uranium enrichment capabilities, including for HALEU.
The U.S. nuclear energy and defense industries will need large quantities of enriched uranium, including HALEU, which the U.S. currently does not produce at commercial scale. Over the past four years, the United States has incentivized investments in critical mineral processing and refining for electric vehicles and renewable energy technologies with IRA tax credits. However, since uranium is no longer a USGS critical mineral, it has been excluded from these incentives. Despite enriched uranium’s importance to the next generation of nuclear reactors as well as to nuclear weapons, and despite Russia’s dominance in production, the United States has not taken decisive action to incentivize domestic industry. The DOE’s HALEU program funded under the IRA has so far proved inadequate in stimulating new domestic enrichment capacity. The next administration can incentivize domestic uranium enrichment by making such facilities eligible for the same 45X and 48C production and investment tax credits that currently benefit critical mineral projects.
- Foster conducive tariff policies with uranium-producing allies.
Tariffs are a bedrock of President Trump’s economic diplomacy tool kit. At a time when China and Russia already account for 62.6 percent of the world’s enrichment capacity, it is particularly important to foster collaborative policies with uranium-rich allies. Not only is Canada the second-largest producer and exporter of uranium in the world, behind only Kazakhstan, it is the single largest supplier of uranium to the United States, providing about 25 percent of its domestic consumption. Canada does not enrich its own uranium, but it provides critical feedstock for the United States as it builds its own enrichment capabilities. President Trump’s announcement that he would impose a 25 percent tariff on all Canadian imports will have significant consequences for the United States’ uranium supply. The imposition of tariffs on this uranium and/or the volatile tariff policies more generally have the potential to displace Canadian uranium exports to other countries, exacerbating an existing uranium shortage in the United States. Rather than imposing the proposed tariffs, the United States should enact a preferential supplier trade regime in the nuclear sector with key allies. Preferential trade status for nuclear suppliers in countries like Australia, Canada, France, Japan, and the United Kingdom can strengthen uranium security through trade, rather than weaken supply chains with tariffs.
- Enhance partnerships with key allies Canada and Australia through a Joint Uranium Supply Chain Partnership Initiative.
U.S. domestic uranium mining will not be enough—the United States sits on a mere 1 percent of the world’s known uranium resources. Canada and Australia are two of the United States’ closest allies, from both economic and defense standpoints, with significant uranium reserves and production capacity. The next administration should deepen cooperation among these allies to advance the development of uranium supply chains for both civilian and defense purposes. A precedent of trade and defense agreements and partnerships already exists among these three nations; take, for example, the Canada-Australia Partnership on Emerging Missile Defence Research, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue linking the United States and Australia, and the AUKUS agreement linking the United States and Canada. A multilateral joint partnership for uranium production and nuclear capabilities between these three governments and their private industry counterparts holds the potential to strengthen uranium supply chains for allies.
- Secure mineral offtake from uranium-rich countries currently dominated by China.
Finally, the United States must secure mineral offtake from uranium-rich countries by encouraging investments in developing nations with shared interests—a strategy that China has artfully deployed for decades by integrating minerals security into its foreign policy. Namibia, Brazil, and Kazakhstan have significant uranium reserves and significant potential to supply the United States with uranium feedstock for nuclear fuel. The United States can no longer allow China to be the only power fostering bilateral cooperation and stakeholder relations targeting the mining industries of developing nations. Namibia has a long-standing friendly relationship with the United States based on shared democratic principles and trade relations through the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). The United States is Brazil’s second-largest trading partner and has invested more foreign direct investment (FDI) dollars than any other country. Moreover, the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) set up its first office in Latin America in Brazil and is providing financing for projects related to other commodities, including nickel and rare earths. Finally, the United States was the first country to recognize Kazakhstan’s independence, and the two nations routinely cooperate on nonproliferation issues as a cornerstone of their relationship. There is great opportunity for deepening bilateral partnerships in the uranium industry, and the next administration should prioritize fostering industry partnerships, encouraging U.S. investment in exploration abroad, and opening more avenues for engagement between the administration and the governments of these uranium-rich nations.